PANEL: Roundtable: Post-Modern Constitutional History: Problems and Possibilities
Saturday, October 24, 3:30-5:00Moderator: Sanford Levinson, University of Texas School of Law
Text & Context: Intellectual History and the Post-Modern Constitutional History
William Fischer, Harvard Law SchoolSince the 1950s, most scholarship in American legal history has taken the form of social, political, or economic history--studies of how the development of particular systems of legal rules reflected or affected the shifting of fortunes of socioeconomic classes. In the past two decades, however, a growing group of legal historians have been employing modes of inquiry and analysis best described as intellectual history. In these studies, law is characterized, not as a weapon in the war of parties and interest groups, but as a discursive system, connected in myriad ways to the development of other discursive systems (economic theories, political theories, popular ideology, etc.). Intellectual history has itself become embroiled in a number of controversies. Post-Structuralist theory has challenged many of the assumptions of contextualism. How should constitutional and legal history respond to the challenges posed by Structuralism, Contextualism, Textualism, and New Historicism. This paper will consider these issues.
Constitutional Narratives and Constitutional Interpretation
J.M. Balkin, Yale Law SchoolNarrative construction and deployment are essential features of American constitutional interpretation. These narratives frame past and present experience and prescribe future activity. They are forms of shared "cultural software" that bind together members of a common political culture. Often they are adapted from older sources, including the Bible and classical history. These narratives are inevitably incomplete, compressed versions of more complicated events, which provide ample opportunities for improvisation and contestation. Narratives are reshaped as they meet with recalcitrant experience, yet they also have the power to "make themselves true" in practice by shaping people's expectations and behavior in response to those expectations. Although narrative construction is deeply implicated in all constitutional interpretation, no questions of constitutional law features a single, comprehensive narrative that can take pride of place among all others. Rather, constitutional interpretations may differ because multiple narratives can be deployed, and often one can contest a narrative only by offering another one in its place. The questions for constitutional theory are how to become conscious of the power of narratives in interpretation, now to deal with competing narrative constructions and how to persuade one's self and one's audience to choose among them.
Engendering the Jury: Theories of Spectatorship and Doubts About Democracy
Nancy Isenberg, Department of History, University of Northern IowaThis paper examines the ways in which gendered assumptions have informed American legal and constitutional practice. It focuses on the jury as a site of cultural contestation. Concern about the capacity of juries to function within a democracy are deeply rooted in American democratic theory. This paper argues that public criticism of juries is an effect of discourse, registering more basic cultural fears about democracy encoded in American life. The rise of the mass media, particularly film and television, have transformed the way in which the role of juries and the notion of the public have been constructed. Gender has been central to the way juries have been constructed in recent popular culture. This paper examines these gendered constructions. It focuses on three celebrated cases of the post-war period and links them to various movements in popular culture. The first case study looks at the connections between film noir and the Rosenberg trial. The second examines the connections between Hollywood conceptions of the rebel, particularly Bonnie and Clyde, and the Patty Hearst case. Finally, I examine the ways in which gender and race were encoded in the treatment of the O.J. Simpson case in the media.
Deconstructing the Constitution Canon: A Pragmatic Agenda for Post-Modern Constitutional History
Saul Cornell, Department of History, Ohio State UniversityMany commentators have suggested that deconstructive reading is inimical to historical practice. The version of deconstruction that has drawn the ire of historians is rooted in the theoretical writings of French post-structuralism. A different variant of deconstructive practice emerges in the work of neo-pragmatists such as Richard Rorty. When recast in Rortyean terms, a post-modern constitutional history would reunite the perspective of social history with that of recent intellectual history. At the core of this agenda would be the deconstruction of the existing canon of American constitutional history. The critique of the canon contains two inter-related methodological process: ideological deconstruction and historical reconstruction. The first step is designed to expose the ideological forces that have shaped the creation of an approved body of texts and demonstrate the historical forces that favored some texts over others. The second step involves unearthing those texts that did not achieve canonical status. When the canonical and non-canonical are examined together, it is possible to restore a voice to alternative constitutional visions. In place of the dominant Whig and declension narratives that shaped so much writing about American constitutional history, a post-modern constitutional history would focus on the past as a contested terrain in which competing visions vied for dominance.